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Abstract
We extend the property-rights framework to allow for: a separation of the own-
ership rights of access and veto; and sequential investment. Parties investing
rst (ex ante) do so before contracting is possible. Parties that invest second
(ex post) can contract on (at least some) of their investment costs. Along with
this cost-sharing eect, the incentive to invest is aected by a strategic eect
generated by sequential investment. Together these eects can overturn some
of the predictions of the property-rights literature. For example, the most in-
clusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are
complementary.
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1 Introduction
When trade requires relationship-specic investments, incomplete contracting can
lead to ineciencies (see Williamson (1975), Klein, Crawford & Alchian (1978) and
Grout (1984)). By altering bargaining power, a clever reassignment of property rights
can (partially) alleviate the hold-up problem by protecting investors from expropri-
ation at renegotiation. The key nding of the property-rights approach { Grossman
& Hart (1986), Hart & Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) { is that when contracts are
incomplete, the residual rights of control that come with ownership over critical as-
sets become important in determining the bargaining power (and claim on surplus)
of the agents. Under these conditions asset ownership is designed to optimize the
investment incentives of agents who make key relationship-specic investments, by
protecting them from opportunism when renegotiation occurs.
Demsetz (1996) and Rajan & Zingales (1998) have criticized the model of Hart
& Moore (1990) for its broad denition of ownership. Others, such as Bolton &
Scharfstein (1998), have pointed out that the original property-rights model is at best
a theory of the entrepreneurial rm as it does not t the picture of large modern-day
corporations where ownership by shareholders is often separated from the day-to-day
control of managers.1
It follows that a more nuanced denition of property rights is needed to give
a clearer understanding of real-world rm structures. Bel (2006) and Bel (2011)
unbundle ownership into the right to access and use an asset and the right to veto
access to an asset.2 Using this rened notion of property rights, and allowing for
structures explicitly ruled out in Hart & Moore (1990), Bel examines alternative
ownership arrangements such as hybrid organizations, joint ventures and ownership
by non-investors.
The possibility of unbundling access and veto rights has far reaching consequences
for the optimal allocation of property rights because the requirement that rights of
access and veto always be transferred together is often too restrictive to solve complex
incentive problems. For example, when all assets are complements at the margin Bel
(2006) found that it is optimal for all agents to have access to every asset and that
no veto powers should be allocated at all. Thus, there should be a kind of communal
access to resources. This ensures that the hold-up problem is minimized because
nobody can threaten to withhold these assets from another party.
A second restriction of the standard property-rights model is that specic in-
vestments are made simultaneously. A related literature focuses on the timing of
investments as a way to overcome holdup (see for example Neher (1999), Smirnov &
Wait (2004a), and Smirnov & Wait (2004b)).3 The key insight of this literature is
1Bolton & Scharfstein (1998) also argued that the property-rights model ignores agency problems
because owners are also managers of the rm.
2Bel (2006) uses the properties of ownership { access, withdrawal, management exclusion and
alienation { dened in Schlager & Ostrom (1992) and groups them into access and veto.
3Contracting can be made possible when projects progress from the accumulation of physical
assets or collateral (Neher (1999) or because the project itself becomes more tangible, as in Smirnov
& Wait (2004a) and Smirnov & Wait (2004b). Also see De Fraja (1999), Che (2000) and Admanti
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that sequential investment can alleviate holdup by allowing investment to occur when
the contacting environment is more complete.
This paper combines the more rened notion of ownership as well as the possibility
to make sequential investment to construct a new model of the optimal allocation of
property rights.
With simultaneous investment, as in the standard model, both parties invest ex
ante, before contracting is possible. For instance, a group of scientists and a large
manufacturer of video game consoles are collaborating to develop and bring to market
a new graphics processor unit that is to be included in the next generation of consoles.
The two tasks (development of a new graphics processor, completed by the scientists,
and the establishment of the production process, undertaken by the manufacturer)
might need to be completed at the same time to ensure that the product is for the
start of the new season, for example. Once both relationship-specic investments
have been sunk, the project becomes tangible and the parties renegotiate, where each
party's bargaining power depends on the assets they own.
Rather than investing in the two tasks at the same time, it could be the case that
the scientic investment must be made rst { this situation could arise when it is not
possible to start establishing a manufacturing process before the exact nature of the
graphics processor is known. For instance, initially the scientists invest in developing
the know-how and technologies required to make the new graphics processor unit.
While none of these investments could have been adequately described in a contract
ex ante, as the research proceeds the exact nature of the processor, its specications
and its manufacturing requirements become known and veriable. It is the scientists'
research that makes this possible. At this stage, the parties are in an environment in
which contracting is (at least partly) possible, so that the manufacturer can write a
cost-sharing agreement prior to sinking her investment. The manufacturer's invest-
ment completes the project and both parties receive their negotiated share of the
gains from trade.
We analyze the incentives to invest in these alternative timing regimes, extending
Smirnov & Wait (2004a) by allowing for an arbitrary number of investors, alternative
cost-sharing rules and the possibility of investments to be complementary at the
margin. Given this structure, we identify three features that aect both ex ante and
ex post investment. (1) Cost-sharing. As a contract can be written to share (at
least some) of the ex post investor's investment costs, followers will have an enhanced
incentive to invest. (2) Strategic eect. As the followers observe ex ante investments
before making their own investment, there is a Stackelberg-type strategic eect that is
not present with simultaneous investments; given the complementarity of investments,
the strategic eect enhances the incentive to invest for the leaders. (3) Discounting
future payos. If an investment is sequenced, ex ante investors need to wait longer to
receive their payos, dampening their incentive to invest.4
The timing of investment also has implication for the optimal allocation of prop-
erty rights. As noted, Bel (2006) suggests that with non-rival investment all parties in
& Perry (1991).
4This eect was analyzed in Smirnov & Wait (2004a).
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the grand coalition should have access to the asset, and no one should have veto rights.
This is not necessarily true if investments need to be made sequentially. Given the
complementarity of investments, a higher level of ex ante investment increases the ex
post incentive to invest. However, it also increases the cost-sharing burden on the ex
ante investors, which gives them a reduced incentive to invest. If an ex ante investor
makes a relatively large contribution to total surplus and faces a strong disincentive
to invest due to the cost-sharing eect, it could be necessary to dampen ex post incen-
tives to invest. This can be achieved by reducing ex post investors property rights {
for example giving ex ante investors veto rights over a set of assets. Consequently, the
most inclusive ownership structure is no longer second-best optimal. This prediction
seems to arise naturally out of the sequencing of investment, and suggests that ex
ante agents rely more heavily on property rights to protect their investment returns
from holdup than ex post agents who have the option to use alternative means of
protection, in this case cost-sharing contracts. These issues are an important con-
sideration in the ownership (and access) structures of real rms. For example, this
prediction is consistent with the ownership structure chosen when Daiichi Sankyo,
Japan's third largest drug maker, bought 51% of the Indian generic drug manufac-
turer Ranbaxy Laboratories Limit. Notably, it was Daiichi Sanko, the party engaged
in R&D and drug invention (ex ante investments), that took a controlling stake in
the generic pharmaceutical manufacturer (the party making the ex post investment).
We also discuss how sequencing of investment could aect the predictions of Hart
& Moore (1990). The combination of sequencing of investment and the possibility
for cost sharing creates the potential for a trade o between encouraging ex post or
ex ante investment. When such a tradeo exists, it could be preferable to discourage
ex post investment, particulary if ex ante investment is relatively more important
in terms of the surplus it generates. As a consequence, it is no longer necessarily
true that an asset idiosyncratic to an ex post investor should be held by that agent
(Hart & Moore's (1990) Proposition 5) or that just one agent have veto rights over
an asset (Proposition 4). Moreover, it might be preferred that an indispensable (ex
post) investor does not own the asset (Proposition 6) or indeed that complementary
assets are not owned together (Proposition 8). The intuition underlying all of these
results is the same. Sequencing of investment and cost-sharing can induce followers
to overinvest, which in turn can reduce the leaders' incentive to invest. In this case, it
could be better to allocate property rights in such a way so as to reduce the incentives
of the followers to invest.
2 The Model
The model has two periods, Date 0 (ex ante) and Date 1 (ex post). There is no
discounting. The economy is populated by a nite set of n risk-neutral agents. The
grand coalition is denoted by N and can be divided into two mutually exclusive but
collectively exhaustive subsets Nea and Nep (Nea \Nep = ; and Nea [Nep = N), such
that all agents who invest ex ante are members of Nea and all agents who invest ex
post are members of Nep. Nea and Nep are determined exogenously. There are J ex
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ante agents and I ex post agents where I + J = N . The set of productive assets A
contains a nite number of m assets.
Each agent can make a (human capital) investment xi that costs Ci(xi), where
Ci(0) = 0, Ci(xi) is twice dierentiable as well as strictly increasing and convex in
xi, where xi is a scalar lying in [0; xi).
5 Thus, the marginal cost of investment is
increasing with the level of investment, as summarized in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. The cost function Ci(xi) is non-negative, twice dierentiable, strictly
increasing in xi and strictly convex; i.e., Ci(xi)  0, Ci(0) = 0, C 0i(xi) > 0 and C 00i (xi) >
0 for xi 2 [0; xi) with C 0i(0) = 0 and limxi!xi C 0i(xi) =1.
We adopt the incomplete-contracts framework of Grossman & Hart (1986): Date 0
investment decisions cannot be specied in a contract as they are too complex or
nebulous; ex ante investments are made non-cooperatively; and it is not possible to
write a contract specifying the item to be traded ex post or to write a cost-sharing
or prot-sharing contract at Date 0.
Let x = (x1; : : : ; xn). Consider a coalition S of agents that control a subset of
assets A  A.6 This gives us the following denition for the value function v.
Denition 1. Let v(S;A j x) be the value function of a coalition S  N in control
of the subset of assets A  A, where x is the vector of investments by all agents.
The marginal return to investment of agent i in coalition S for a given vector of
investments x is denoted by
vi(S;A j x)  @v(S;A j x)
@xi
: (1)
The value generated by a coalition S depends on: (i) the agents in S; (ii) the
assets controlled by S; and (iii) the human-capital investments of the agents in S.
We make the following standard assumptions.
Assumption 2. The value function v(S;A j x)  0 and v(;; A j x) = 0 where ;
is the empty set. v(S;A j x) is twice dierentiable in x and increasing in x; i.e.,
vi(S;A j x)  0 for xi 2 [0; xi). v(S;A j x) is also concave.
Assumption 3. vi(S;A j x) = 0 if i =2 S.
Assumption 4. vij(S;A j x) = @vi(S;Ajx)
@xj
 0; 8 j 6= i 2 S.
Assumption 5. v(S;A j x)  v(S 0; A0 j x)+v(SnS 0; AnA0 j x);8 S 0  S and A0  A.
Assumption 6. vi(S;A j x)  vi(S 0; A0 j x); 8 S 0  S; 8 A0  A.
5Note that xi > 0 and it is possible that xi =1.
6The specics of the control structures are detailed below in Section 2.1.
5
Assumption 2 says that investments increase value but at a decreasing rate. As-
sumption 3 suggests that i's investment only aects coalitions of which she is a mem-
ber. Assumption 4 indicates that investments are complementary at the margin. The
superadditivity of the value function is captured by Assumption 5; assets and agents
are always (weakly) complementary, which in turn implies the grand coalition must
always produce the largest surplus. Assumption 6 says agents and assets are always
complementary at the margin. As in Hart & Moore (1990), Assumptions 5 and 6
together imply that the marginal and total values are positively correlated.
2.1 Property rights
Ownership of an asset can involve dierent rights. Consequently, it is sometimes
possible that these dierent aspects of property rights can be separated and granted
to dierent parties. To capture this our model follows Bel (2006) in assuming that
asset ownership can be unbundled into the right to access an asset and the right to
veto others' access to an asset. This section formalizes the denitions of deterministic
access, veto and control.
Consider rst the rights to access an asset. Rights of access are essentially the
right to use a particular asset { that is, put it to productive use. To describe this, let
(S) be the subset of assets that coalition S can access at Date 1. If a sub-coalition
(S
0
) can access an asset then the full coalition to which it belongs (S) must also
be able to access the asset. It follows that the grand coalition can access all assets
((N) = A). This discussion is summarized in the following denition. The access
structure of the economy is dened as follows:
Denition 2. Let the mapping  from the set of subsets of N to the set of subsets
of A be dened as the access structure of the economy. The mapping  satises:
(S 0)  (S) 8 S 0  S and (N) = A: (2)
Next, consider veto rights. A veto, when exercised, allows a party to stop someone
else from using a particular asset. Specically, coalition S has veto rights with respect
to asset ak if it can prevent a party who is not a member of S from using it. (S) is
the subset of assets that the coalition S has veto rights on at Date 1. Following Bel
(2006), we assume that if a subset S
0
of coalition S can veto the use of an asset, then
the use of that asset can also be vetoed by the whole coalition. The structure of veto
rights is dened as:
Denition 3. Let the mapping  from the set of subsets of N to the set of subsets
of A be dened as the veto structure of the economy. The mapping  satises:
(S 0)  (S) 8 S 0  S and (N) = A: (3)
A party's outside option only includes the assets that it can access without the
threat of being vetoed by someone else. This idea is captured by a coalition's control
rights over an asset. Specically, given the structure of access and veto rights, a
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coalition of agents S is said to control an asset a if and only if S has access to the
asset and no coalition outside of S has veto over a. The control structure of the
economy is important in determining the investment incentives of the agents because
a coalition can only put an asset to productive use (and derive surplus from it) if it
controls the asset. Formally:
Denition 4. A control structure is a mapping  from the set of subsets of N to the
set of subsets of A, such that (S) = (S)n(NnS). The control structure satises:
(S 0)  (S) 8 S 0  S and (N) = A: (4)
As noted above, this denition of ownership allows for a greater range of ownership
possibilities. For example, a coalition could have access rights to a particular asset
or a set of assets, but no veto rights; this is equivalent to a renter of the asset or a
tenant who only has the rights to use the asset. Alternatively, a coalition could have
veto rights but no access rights to an asset, as would be the case with a landlord.
The other two cases are equivalent to the control structures in Hart & Moore (1990);
a coalition with both access and veto rights and a coalition with neither the rights of
access or veto to a particular asset.
2.2 The timing of investment
There are two alternative investment timing regimes. With simultaneous investment
all parties invest at Date 0 (ex ante) before contracting is possible, as in the standard
property-rights model { that is, Nea = N and Nep = ;. At the end of the ex ante
period all relationship-specic investments have been made. At this stage, the parties
bargain over the surplus (detailed below). The timing is summarized in Figure 1, but
it is important to note that investments are not contractible ex ante and a surplus
sharing rule is never feasible (that is, surplus is never veriable).
The alternative is sequential investment. We assume that the subset of agents Nea
invest ex ante. Having observed these investments, the remaining agents { the ex post
investors { make their investments. We allow for the possibility that some of the cost
of these ex post investments can be shared with all agents through some cost-sharing
arrangement.7 Once all investments have been made, the parties can negotiate over
the distribution of surplus. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the sequential model.
2.3 Bargaining over surplus and costs
In the simultaneous investment model the agents bargain over the allocation of surplus
in the ex post period. We follow convention and use the Shapley value. Letting Bi
7In some research projects, for example, after some initial investment it becomes clear what
additional investments need to be made, even if the nal product is still slightly nebulous and
unveriable. In this case, the cost of the new laboratory or the next phase of research could be
shared amongst both ex ante and ex post investors.
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Ex ante
 property rights
allocated
 N invest
Ex post
 bargaining
over surplus
 production
Figure 1: Simultaneous investment
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Ex ante
 property rights
allocated
 Nea invest
 Nep invest
(cost sharing)
Ex-post
 bargaining
over surplus
 production
Figure 2: Sequential investment
be agent i's share of gross surplus, the following equality must hold:X
i2N
Bi( j x) = v(N;A j x): (5)
Equation (5) says that the surplus allocated to all agents sums to the total surplus
generated by the grand coalition. As in Hart & Moore (1990), the Shapley value Bi
is dened as:
Denition 5. Agent i's share of gross surplus Bi is given by the Shapley value.
Bi( j x) =
X
Sji2S
p(S)[v(S; (S) j x)  v(Snfig; (Snfig) j x)]; (6)
where p(S) = (jSj 1)!(jN j jSj)!
(jN j)! .
Now consider sequential investment. Again agent i 's share of gross surplus Bi
is given by the Shapley value. Sequential investment introduces the possibility of
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the sharing the cost of ex post investment amongst all the agents. To capture this
let  be the set of exogenous sharing rules detailing how ex post investment costs
will be shared among all agents, where  = filj i 2 Nep; l 2 Ng. Note given that
il denotes the proportion of ex post agent i's investment cost paid by agent l, we
make the additional requirements that il 2 [0; 1] 8 i 2 Nep;8 l 2 N and thatP
l2N il = 1;8 i 2 Nep. Consequently, the following equality holds:X
l2N
Bl( j x) 
X
i2Nep
X
l2N
ilCi(xi) = v(N;A j x) 
X
i2Nep
Ci(xi): (7)
Equation (7) gives the gross surplus, minus all ex post investment costs.
To provide some intuition, consider again the research project example,  deter-
mines how much of the cost of the secondary research phase is paid for by ex ante
investors, and how much of these costs are borne by the ex post investors themselves.
Note also that this general set-up allows for ii = 1 8 i 2 Nep, such that each ex
post investor pays for all of their own investment costs. This also generalizes the
cost-sharing rule in Smirnov & Wait (2004a), in which 21 = 22 = 0:5. While we
do not explicitly model the cost-sharing rules, they could be determined by various
factors and can be thought of as the reduced-form solution of that process.8
3 Investment incentives
The grand coalition N generates the largest surplus for any given level of investment
(Assumption 5). The superadditivity assumption says that there are always gains
from trade and that it is never optimal to deny some productive agents the possi-
bility to trade with each other. As in Hart & Moore (1990, 1127-8), the rst-best
maximization problem problem is:
max
x
W (x) = v(N;A j x) 
X
i2N
Ci(xi): (8)
From this, the welfare-maximizing investments (the vector x) solve:
vi(N;A j x) = C 0i(xi ) 8 i 2 N: (9)
The solution for x exists and is unique given Assumptions 1 and 2. We now turn
our attention to the investment outcomes under simultaneous and sequential timing
regimes, taking for the moment the allocation of property rights (the control structure
) as given. First we analyze simultaneous investment, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Second, we examine sequential investment, as shown in Figure 2.
8The cost-sharing rule could arise from the relative bargaining strengths of the parties, arising in
an extensive-form bargaining game such as Rubinstein (1982) or Binmore, Rubinstein & Wolinsky
(1986). In principle the solution concept of this game could also be the Shapley value.
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3.1 Simultaneous investment
With simultaneous investment all agents invest ex ante. Attempting to maximize
their surplus, the rst-order condition for each agent is:
@Bi( j x)
@xi
=
@Ci(xi)
@xi
8 i 2 N (10)
where, from Denition 5 and Assumption 3, agent i's marginal return is
@Bi( j x)
@xi
=
X
Sji2S
p(S)vi(S; (S) j x): (11)
Once again, the solution for each agent's investment choice exists and is unique
given Assumptions 1 and 2.
3.2 Sequential timing
With sequential investment we consider ex post investment and ex ante investments
in turn.
3.2.1 Ex post investments
Ex post investors choose their investment after having observed ex ante investments.
For expositional purposes, assume for the moment that ex ante investments are ex-
ogenous. An ex post agent i's maximization problem is:
max
xi
Bi( j xea; xep) 
X
k 6=i;k;i2Nep
kiCk(xep;k)  iiCi(xep;i): (12)
The rst term is agent i's share of gross surplus, the second term is i's share of
other ex post investment costs, while the last term is i's own investment cost. If
ii < 1 agent i does not pay the full cost of investment. The vector xep of ex post
equilibrium investments solves the rst-order conditions:
@Bi( j xea; xep)
@xep;i
= ii
@Ci(xep;i)
@xep;i
8 i 2 Nep: (13)
From condition (13), ex post equilibrium investment is determined by the control
structure of the economy , the set of sharing rules  and the level of ex ante invest-
ment xea. Following this, we say that the vector of equilibrium investments be gov-
erned by the implicit function xep = R(; jxea), where xep;i = Ri(; jxea) 8 i 2 Nep.
Lemma 1 describes how ex post investment responds to changes in ex ante invest-
ment.
Lemma 1. An increase in any ex ante investment (weakly) increases equilibrium in-
vestment for all ex post investors { that is, for a given control structure and set of
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sharing rules, an increase in any ex ante investment, ceteris paribus, (weakly) in-
creases equilibrium investment of all ex post agents, or that @Ri(;jxea)
@xea;j
 0 8 i 2 Nep
and 8 j 2 Nea.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 relies on the assumption that all investments are strictly complementary.
If an ex ante agent increases her investment, the marginal productivity of all ex post
agents also increase, leading to higher ex post equilibrium investment.
3.2.2 Ex ante investments
Consider next the maximization problem for an ex ante agent. Given the Stackelberg-
timing of investment ex ante investors incorporate the (implicit) ex post reaction
functions R = fRi : 8 i 2 Nepg into their maximization problems. A representative
ex ante agent j 2 Nea solves:
max
xj
Bj( j xea; R) 
X
i2Nep
ijCi(Ri)  Cj(xea;j): (14)
The rst term gives j's share of gross surplus, while the middle term species how
much of the ex post investment costs are paid by the ex ante agent j (a consequence
of the fact that ii < 1 ex post agents can contract on their investments costs).
Finally, the term on the right gives the cost of investing xea;j. As shown in Smirnov
& Wait (2004a) if an ex ante investor anticipates a negative return they will not
invest, potentially accentuating the hold-up problem. However, to focus on other
issues, we consider the case when Bj( j xea; xep) 
P
i2Nep ijCi(xep;i) Cj(xea;j) 
0 8 j 2 Nea; that is, all ex ante investors anticipate a positive return at the equilibrium
investment levels.
The vector of ex ante equilibrium investments xea solves the rst-order conditions:
@Bj( j xea; R)
@xea;j
+
X
i2Nep

@Bj( j xea; R)
@Ri
  ij @Ci(Ri)
@Ri

@Ri
@xea;j
=
@Cj(xea;j)
@xea;j
(15)
8 j 2 Nea, where @Bj(jxea;R)@xea;j is simply the marginal return to investment and
@Cj(xea;j)
@xea;j
is the investor's marginal cost.
Again, to focus on the issues at hand, we assume that there exists a unique solution
to the system of equations 13 and 15. Essentially this requires that the direct eect of
party j's investment on their own benets and costs is larger than the indirect eect
that arises through changes in others' equilibrium investment levels (in response to a
change in a j's investment). This is summarized in the following Assumption.
Assumption 7. The solution to the system of equations 13 and 15 exists and is
unique.
Sherali (1984) investigates the conditions required for the existence of a unique so-
lution in a Stackelberg model with multiple leaders and followers, without considering
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the added complication of ownership. While these conditions are not our focus here,
it is worth noting that a unique solution existed for any examples we constructed that
satisfy the assumptions of the model; see the discussion in Example 1.
Comparing condition (10) to (15) reveals that ex ante investment incentives change
due to the appearance of the additional term
P
i2Nep
h
@Bj(jxea;R)
@Ri
  ij @Ci(Ri)@Ri
i
@Ri
@xea;j
.
This new term arises under sequential investment because ex ante agents internalize
the eect that their investment choices have on ex post investment { we refer to this
as the internalization eect.
To analyze the internalization eect, note that from Lemma 1 @Ri
@xea;j
 0 8 i 2
Nep and 8 j 2 Nea. Notice that the term inside the summation bracket on the left
hand side of equation 15 can be separated into two parts. First, consider
@Bj(jxea;R)
@Ri
.
An increase in ex post equilibrium investment has two opposing eects: (a) it makes
all ex post agents more productive, increasing gross surplus; and (b) more productive
ex post agents demand a greater share of gross surplus, which reduces the share of
surplus for ex ante investors. However, from Assumption 6 the positive eect of (a)
weakly dominates the negative incentive for ex ante investment from (b).9 The second
term, ij
@Ci(Ri)
@Ri
, denotes the impact on ex ante marginal costs. It follows that ij > 0
increases the marginal cost for an ex ante investor.
To summarize, as
@Bj(jxea;R)
@Ri
 0 and ij @Ci(Ri)@Ri > 0, the sign of the internalization
eect is ambiguous. However, if ij = 0, the internalization eect is non-negative, as
summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For a given control structure all investments will (weakly) increase
relative to the simultaneous timing regime provided ii = 1 8 i 2 Nep.
Proof: See Appendix A.
It is important to note that as all the functions are continuous, one can slightly
decrease some ii and still have the result that there is an increase in all investments.
Proposition 1 outlines the conditions for which sequential investment (weakly) im-
proves the under-investment problem due to holdup, generalizing the result of Smirnov
&Wait (2004b). While in their model they include discounting (favoring simultaneous
investment) and cost sharing (which favors sequential investment), they do not allow
for the possibility of complementarity between ex ante and ex post investments.10
In the model presented here, provided ii is suciently high { so the imposition of
follower costs on ex ante agents is relatively small { all investments weakly increase.
Our assumption of the complementarity between investments drives this result. If ii
is small enough for some i, ex ante investors could reduce their investment relative to
their choice with the simultaneous regime because of the potential increase in costs
they face. The intuition of Proposition 1 is highlighted in the following Example.
9To see this, rst note that from Denition 5
@Bj(jxea;R)
@Ri
=
P
Sjj2S v
i(S; (S)jxea; R)  
vi(Snfjg; (Snfjg)jxea; R). From Assumption 6 vi(S; (S)jxea; R)  vi(Snfjg; (Snfjg)jxea; R),
meaning that the overall sign is non-negative.
10Essentially, their Assumption 2 reduces the internalization eect to zero.
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Example 1
Assume there are only 2 agents and 2 assets, where each asset is controlled by a
dierent agent. The rst agent invests ex ante, while the second agent invests ex post.
The coalition containing only the rst agent generates a surplus of ln(x1), while the
coalition containing only the second agent generates a surplus of ln(x2). The coalition
containing both agents generates a surplus of ln(x1) + ln(x2) + 0:3  x1  x2 + 2. The
costs are assumed to be Ci(xi) =
1
2
x2i 8 i. One can check that for values x1 < 1:7
and x2 < 1:7 Assumptions 1-6 are satised. For values higher than 1.7 an alternative
specic functional form could apply to ensure Assumptions 1-6 are satised. In the
rst-best case, investments are x1 = x2 =
p
1=0:7  1:195, and W = 1:3567.11
The following Shapley values for both players can be derived B1 = ln(x1) + 0:15 
x1  x2 + 1 and B2 = ln(x2) + 0:15  x1  x2 + 1. From the simultaneous case FOC
(10), investments are x1 = x2 =
p
2=1:7  1:0847, and W = 1:339.
Now let us consider two dierent sequential regimes. The rst regime is when
22 = 1 and the second regime is when 22 = 21 = 0:5. The rst regime results in
the following system of equations:(
2
x1
+ 0:3x2 + (0:3x1   x2) 0:15x
2
2
1+x22
= 2x1;
2
x2
+ 0:3x1 = x2:
(16)
The solutions are x1  1:0914, x2  1:0852 and W = 1:3401. These results suggest
that both investments increase after the switch from the simultaneous regime to
the rst sequential regime. Similarly, the second regime results in x1  1:0677,
x2  1:5834 and W = 1:2087 which suggests that only ex post investment increases
after the switch from the simultaneous regime to the second sequential regime. Note
that the incentives of the ex post agent has improved so much that he overinvests in
comparison with the rst best level of investment.
Note that Assumption 7 { that a unique solution exists to the system of equations
13 and 15 { holds in this example. This is because the direct eect of the rst rm's
investment on their own benets and costs is signicantly larger than the indirect
eect from a change in rm 2's investment that comes as a result of a change in rm
1's investment.
This example highlights the tradeo present in our model. Assuming comple-
mentarity, sequential investment without cost sharing raises the incentive to invest
for both ex post and ex ante investors. However, the possibility of cost-sharing can
create a trade o. With cost sharing ex ante investors will temper their investment,
understanding the ow-through eect of ex post investment and the additional costs
they have to bear. Cost sharing can also create perverse incentives for ex post agents,
as this example shows. Consequently depending on the sharing rules used, the total
welfare can both go up or down when the regime is switched from simultaneous to
11Given Assumptions 1 and 2, any derived solution has to be unique. If the solution involves
x1 < 1:7 and x2 < 1:7 then specifying functions for other values is not critical.
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sequential.12
4 Property rights with sequential investment
Previously, optimal ownership has been analyzed when investments are made simul-
taneously (see Hart & Moore (1990) and Bel (2006) amongst others). Less is known
about the allocation of property rights when there is sequential investment. In order
to do this we utilize the following denition.
Denition 6. Control structure  is said to be more inclusive than control structure
0 (0 is more exclusive than ) if and only if 0(S)  (S); 8 S  N and 0(S) 
(S), for at least one S  N .
Denition 6 can be interpreted as follows; if either the set of assets controlled
by some coalitions increase or if the number of coalitions who control some set of
assets increases { ceteris paribus { the control structure is said to be more inclusive.
Conversely, if the set of assets controlled by some coalitions decrease or if the number
of coalitions who control some set of assets decreases { ceteris paribus { the control
structure is said to be more exclusive.
The two property rights access and veto have conicting eects on the control
structure. Allocating access rights is said to be inclusive because increasing the
number of assets accessed by a coalition potentially increases the number of assets it
controls without diminishing the control rights of other coalitions. The allocation of
veto rights, on the other hand, is exclusive because increasing the number of assets
for which a coalition has veto rights has no eect on the number of assets it controls
but it potentially reduces the number of assets controlled by other coalitions.
In Bel (2006) under simultaneous investment the most inclusive control structure
is optimal if all assets are complementary at the margin. Specically, he nds that
the property rights assignment requires that each agent individually accesses all the
assets while only the agents of the grand coalition jointly veto all assets. Formally:
(i) = A;(i) = ;; 8 i 2 N and (N) = A. Allocating access and veto rights in
this way means that the control structure is the most inclusive because every agent
controls every asset.
Sequential investment complicates the analysis of property rights because of the
potential interplay between ex ante and ex post investments. First, we analyze Bel's
(2006) result that the most inclusive ownership structure is (second-best) optimal.
Optimality of inclusive structures
Let Assumption 4 hold with equality; so that Lemma 1 is amended to state that
@Ri(;jxea)
@xea;j
= 0.13 Consequently, the marginal return of an agent j is independent of
12As noted above, a third factor, not modeled here, is the discount factor which will always tend
to favor simultaneous over sequential investment (See Smirnov & Wait (2004b)).
13To verify, let Assumption 4 hold with equality and substitute it into the proof of Lemma 1 to
get
@xep;i
@xea;j
= 0.
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the investments of all other agents. It follows that the internalization eect drops
out of the ex ante rst-order conditions. It also means that the rst-order condition
for each agent's investment is independent of all other investments, so that
@Bj( j xea;j)
@xea;j
=
@Cj(xea;j)
@xea;j
8 j 2 Nea: (17)
The same reasoning applies to an ex post investor's maximization problem, which
becomes
@Bi( j xep;i)
@xep;i
= ii
@Ci(xep;i)
@xep;i
8 i 2 Nep: (18)
The following proposition summarizes the impact of a more inclusive control struc-
ture on investment incentives when Assumption 4 holds with equality, all assets are
complementary at the margin and ii = 1 8 i 2 Nep.
Proposition 2. Assume that all assets are complementary, investments are neutral
at the margin and ii = 1 8 i 2 Nep. The optimal ownership structure is the most
inclusive control structure.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Sequencing generates a potential interplay between ex ante investments and the
choice of ex post investments that follow. Making the assumption of investment
neutrality at the margin removes this channel. Our model eectively replicates the
simultaneous investment model of Bel (2006). As a consequence, the most inclusive
ownership structure is second-best optimal. Furthermore, utilizing continuity, one
can determine that this result can hold provided ii is suciently close to one.
Non-optimality of inclusive ownership structures
When ii < 1 for some i 2 Nep at least some ex post investors do not consider their full
marginal cost when investing. This creates a potential externality, and can encourage
followers to make ineciently large investments (as in Example 1). Consequently,
a more inclusive property-rights regime might further accentuate this ex post over-
investment problem. Rather, a more exclusive regime might act as a countervailing
means to oset the cost-sharing rule. Thus, the possibility of cost sharing that arises
due to sequencing of investment means that the most inclusive ownership need not be
the optimal ownership structure. This point is illustrated in the following Example.
Example 2
Assume there are only 2 agents and 3 assets. The rst agent invests ex ante and
controls one asset, while the second agent invests ex post and controls either one or two
assets. If the ex post agent controls only one asset, then the third asset is controlled
by the coalition containing both agents. The coalition containing only the rst agent
15
generates a surplus of ln(x1), while the coalition containing only the second agent
generates a surplus of  ln(x2), where the value of   1 depends on how many assets
ex post agent controls. The coalition containing both agents generates a surplus of
ln(x1)+ln(x2)+0:3x1x2+2. The costs are assumed to be Ci(xi) = 12x2i 8 i. One can
check that for values x1 < 1:7 and x2 < 1:7 Assumptions 1-6 are satised. For values
higher than 1.7 these functions are assumed to be continuously replaced by functions
that satisfy Assumptions 1-6.14 The following Shapley values for both players can be
derived B1 = ln(x1)+
1 
2
ln(x2)+0:15x1x2+1 and B2 = 1+2 ln(x2)+0:15x1x2+1.
Consider the case when there is cost sharing, specically 22 = 21 = 0:5. From the
sequential case FOC (13) and (15), one can derive the following system(
2
x1
+ 0:3x2 +

0:3x1 +
1 
x2
  x2

0:3x22
1++2x22
= 2x1;
1+
x2
+ 0:3x1 = x2:
(19)
When  = 1 the equilibrium investments are x1  1:0677 and x2  1:5834 with
W = 1:2087, while when  = 0:5 the equilibrium investments are x1  1:0776 and
x2  1:397 with W = 1:3043. One can see that when  decreases the ex ante
investment x1 increases, while the ex post investment x2 decreases.
The intuition underlying this example is that a more inclusive control structure
increases ex post investment incentives, meaning that for a given level of ex ante in-
vestment all ex post agents invest more in equilibrium. Increased ex post investment,
of course, increases the costs borne by ex ante agents. Ex ante agents internalize this
anticipated increase. This means that it is possible that ex ante investment can fall
with a more inclusive structure if the internalization eect is negative.
Let us refer back to the example in the introduction in which a group of scientists
and a large video games console manufacturer collaborate on a joint research project.
Suppose now that property rights are reallocated so that some critical assets that were
previously under the control of the scientists are now controlled jointly (i.e., a more
inclusive control structure is implemented). This clearly increases the incentives of the
manufacturer because the scientists can no longer threaten to withhold these assets.
However, this change has potentially made investment more costly for the scientists
because they realize that every extra dollar they invest into the project will increase
the value of the manufacturer's investment by more than it did with the previous
ownership structure. In turn, this can increase the manufacturer's investment but
also the cost borne by the scientist. If this negative eect is suciently large, a
more inclusive structure can reduce investment incentives for the scientist, potentially
reducing overall surplus.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we augment the standard property-rights approach in two ways. First,
we allow for a more rened notion of ownership, allowing for separate rights of access
14See the reasoning in Example 1.
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and veto. Second, we consider the consequences when investment needs to be com-
pleted sequentially. The introduction of sequential investment creates three additional
incentive eects no present in the simultaneous model: (1) a cost-sharing eect; (2) a
strategic (Stackelberg) eect; and (3) a discounting of future payos eect. Focussing
on the rst two eects, we show that it is possible that the sequencing can increase
both ex ante and ex post investments when investments are complementary and cost
sharing of the followers' costs is not too large.
We also examine the aect sequencing has on the optimal allocation of ownership.
Bel (2006) suggests all parties should have access to the asset and no coalition should
have the right to veto anyone else's access. However, once we allow for sequential
investment this need no longer be the case. Specically, it might be advantageous to
dampen the incentives to invest of ex post investors when: higher ex post investment
provides a disincentive for the ex ante investors due to sharing of the followers' in-
vestment costs; and when ex ante investment is relatively important. Consequently,
Bel's (2006) result that all parties should have access and no one should have veto
rights no longer necessarily holds { rather, it could be the case that surplus increases
when ex post investors can have their access vetoed (reducing their outside option,
and their incentive to invest).
A similar point can be made in relation to the predictions in Hart & Moore (1990),
as sequencing and cost sharing can create a potential tradeo between encouraging
investment by the leaders or by the followers. For instance, if it is optimal to dampen
ex post investment incentives (to encourage investment by ex ante agents) it may
no longer be optimal to have: an asset that is idiosyncratic to an ex post agent to
be held by that agent (Proposition 5); just one agent have veto rights over an asset
(Proposition 4); an indispensable (ex post) agent to own the asset (Proposition 6);
or, indeed, to have complementary assets owned together (Proposition 8).
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The vector of Nash equilibrium ex post investments xep is characterised by the system
of equations (13):
@Bi( j xea; xep)
@xep;i
= ii
@Ci(xep;i)
@xep;i
8 i 2 Nep:
Totally dierentiating gives:
J ep
264dxep;1...
dxep;I
375+
2664
P
j2Nea
@2B1
@xep;1@xea;j
dxea;j
...P
j2Nea
@2BI
@xep;I@xea;j
dxea;j
3775 =
264
@C1
@xep;1
d11
...
@CI
@xep;I
dII
375 : (20)
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Where J ep is the I  I matrix:
J ep =
2664
@2B1
@x2ep;1
   @2B1
@xep;1@xep;I
...
. . .
...
@2BI
@xep;I@xep;1
   @2BI
@x2ep;I
3775 +
2664
 11 @2C1@x2ep;1    0
...
. . .
...
0     II @2CI@x2ep;I
3775 : (21)
By Assumptions 1 and 2 J ep is negative denite; that means J ep is invertible. By
Assumption 4 and equation 11, the o-diagonal elements of J ep are nonnegative. So
the inverse J 1ep is a nonpositive matrix (see, e.g. Takayama (1978), p. 393, theorem
4.D.3 [III"] and [IV"]).
Pre-multiplying both sides of (20) by the inverse J 1ep gives:264dxep;1...
dxep;I
375 = J 1ep
2664
 Pj2Nea @2B1@xep;1@xea;j dxea;j + @C1@xep;1d11
...
 Pj2Nea @2BI@xep;I@xea;j dxea;j + @CI@xep;I dII
3775 : (22)
The sharing rules are constant, hence set dii = 0 8 i 2 Nep. Further, to isolate
the impact of a change in investment by only one representative ex ante agent j, set
dxea;k = 0 8 k 6= j 2 Nea, which gives:264dxep;1...
dxep;I
375 = J 1ep
2664
  @2B1
@xep;1@xea;j
dxea;j
...
  @2BI
@xep;I@xea;j
dxea;j
3775 : (23)
Consequently, 2664
@xep;1
@xea;j
...
@xep;I
@xea;j
3775 = J 1ep
2664
  @2B1
@xep;1@xea;j
...
  @2BI
@xep;I@xea;j
3775 : (24)
By Assumption 4 and equation 11, @
2Bk
@xep;k@xea;j
 0 8 k 2 Nep and 8 j 2 Nea.
Given that J 1ep is a nonpositive matrix, the right hand side of (24) must therefore be
(weakly) positive (i.e.,
@xep;i
@xea;j
 0). Hence, an increase in investment by any ex ante
agent increases ex post equilibrium investment of all ex post agents. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) For a given control structure , when investments are simultaneous the internal-
ization eect is zero by assumption Yj = 0 8 j 2 Nea but when investments are
sequential it can be negative, zero or positive; equation 15 can be presented in the
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following way
@Bj( j xea; R)
@xea;j
+ Yj =
@Cj(xea;j)
@xea;j
8 j 2 Nea: (25)
Let us also represent equation 13 in a similar way:
@Bi( j xea; xep)
@xep;i
+ Yi =
@Ci(xep;i)
@xep;i
8 i 2 Nep; (26)
where a similar variable is introduced for ex post investments Yi = (1 ii)@Ci(xep;i)@xep;i 8 i 2
Nep. Note that by construction it is always true that Yi  0.
Now let us combine all ex ante and ex post variable into one set of variables
k=1. . . N and represent system of equations 25 and 26 as
@Bk
@xk
+ Yk =
@Ck
@xk
8 k 2 N: (27)
We want to show that when all Yk  0 8 k 2 N all equilibrium investments are the
same or higher. Therefore, if the internalization eect for sequential investments is
positive Yj  0 8 j 2 Nea then both ex ante and ex post equilibrium investment can
only be higher under sequential investment than under simultaneous investment.
Totally dierentiating the above equation and rearranging gives
J
264dx1...
dxN
375 =
264 dY1...
 dYN
375 : (28)
Where J is the N N matrix:
J =
2664
@2B1
@x21
   @2B1
@x1@xN
...
. . .
...
@2BN
@xN@x1
   @2BN
@x2N
3775 +
2664
 @2C1
@x21
   0
...
. . .
...
0     @2CN
@x2N
3775 : (29)
By Assumptions 1 and 2 J is negative denite; that means J is invertible. By
Assumption 4 and equation 11, the o-diagonal elements of J are nonnegative. So
the inverse J 1 is a nonpositive matrix (see, e.g. Takayama 1985, p. 393, theorem
4.D.3 [III"] and [IV"]).
Pre-multiplying both sides of (28) by the inverse J 1 gives:264
@x1
@Y1
...
@xN
@YN
375 =  J 1
2641...
1
375 : (30)
Given that J 1 is a non-positive matrix, the right hand side of (30) must therefore
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be (weakly) positive (i.e., @xk
@Yk
 0). Hence, a higher internalization eect of any ex
ante agent increases equilibrium investment of all ex ante and ex post agents.
When ii = 1 8 i it is clear that all Yk 8 k 2 N are non-negative, which means
that in this case sequential investment leads to higher equilibrium investments of all
ex ante and ex post agents. This nal observation ends the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Dene function
g(; jx) =
X
S
p(S)v(S; (S)jx) 
X
j2Nea
Cj(xea;j) 
X
i2Nep
X
l2N
ilCi(xep;i):
Note that the rst order conditions 17 and 18 are equivalent to rg(; jx) = 0. Let
 be a more inclusive control structure than 0. For a representative ex ante agent
j 2 Nea dene the function
f(; xea;j) = g(; jxea;j; x j) + (1  )g(0; jxea;j; x j)
for  2 [0; 1], where x j = fxep; xea;1; : : : ; xea;j 1; xea;j+1; : : : ; xea;Jg is exogenous and
let xea;j() solve
@f(; xea;j())
@xea;j
= 0. (31)
Totally dierentiating (31) and taking  as the exogenous variable, gives
dxea;j
d
=  
@2f(;xea;j())
@xea;j@
@2f(;xea;j())
@x2ea;j
; (32)
where
@2f(;xea;j())
@x2ea;j
= 
h
@2Bj()
@x2ea;j
  @2Cj
@x2ea;j
i
+ (1  )
h
@2Bj(
0)
@x2ea;j
  @2Cj
@x2ea;j
i
< 0 by Assump-
tions 1 & 2, while the inequality
@2f(;xea;j())
@xea;j@
=
h
@Bj()
@xea;j
  @Cj
@xea;j
i
 
h
@Bj(
0)
@xea;j
  @Cj
@xea;j
i
=
@Bj()
@xea;j
  @Bj(0)
@xea;j
 0 follows from
Assumption 6 and equation 11. Hence,
dxea;j
d
 0 8 j 2 Nea and xea;j(1)  xea;j(0)
or xea;j()  xea;j(0) 8 j 2 Nea.
For ex post agents, the proof that xep;i()  xep;i(0) 8 i 2 Nep is similar and
will be omitted. Thus, a more inclusive control structure always increases ex ante
and ex post investment incentives and consequently have higher equilibrium invest-
ment. Therefore, the optimal control structure is the most inclusive control structure.
Q.E.D.
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